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# STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# POST COLD WAR AND THE MORAL COURAGE TO SAY NO

BY

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POST COLD WAR

and

THE MORAL COURAGE TO SAY NO

by

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#### ABSTRACT

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National interests these days during the Post Cold War Era are difficult at best to define. Idealists tend to see the world as an opportunity to project their values, whatever they may be. Realists, on the other hand, tend to see the opposite with a sort of 'let's take care of our own problems first before we crusade to right the world' type attitude. Unfortunately, the new world order does not resemble the Cold War 'bipolar' fish bowl anymore and the United States by default, is the world hegemon. This research paper examines the formulation of our national interests and their faulty relationship with past and present 'peace operations' in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Also, it quickly reviews Ideology vs Reality, moves to Peacekeeping vs Peace Enforcement, and finally, discusses exercising restraint or, having 'the moral courage to say no'. The central theme throughout is the lack of clear and concise national interests when using the military element of national power to intervene inside a country's borders to resolve that country's domestic and governance problems. Many thanks go out to global transparency and our technologically advanced media which have played a major role in helping to shape not only our national interests but our national policy and crisis response as well.

# OUTLINE

- I. Introduction
- II. National Interests
  - Realism
  - Idealism
- III. Peace Operations
  - Peacekeeping
  - Peace Enforcement
- IV. Exercising Restraint/Use of Force
  - Somalia
  - Haiti
  - Bosnia
- V. Conclusion

Post Cold War

and

#### The Moral Courage To Say No

# Introduction

Since November of 1989 and the collapse of the "Iron Curtain" much has been written about the uncertainty of the Post Cold War world. Prior to that historical event; however, was a distinct period of bipolar foreign policy between the former Soviet Union and the United States. Things seemed to be predictable and perhaps a little more stable, depending of course, on one's opinion of world stability. Both nations did have one thing in common, they were global hegemons in their own way. The United States, and its Post World War II Allies, pitted themselves against "the communists". Likewise, the former Soviet Union, and its "satellite states", supported worldwide Marxist-Leninist revolutions, and so called people's wars of national liberation, aimed at destabilizing capitalism and its democracies. Starkly, good vs. evil. In fact, both nations distrusted each other so much that in the early 60's, the infamous and very real nuclear arms race almost came to a head with the Cuban Missile Crisis.

In retrospect,...it is now surely clear that the upsurge in American internationalism during the Cold War was a reaction to what was seen as the direct and urgent Soviet threat to the security of the United States...The collapse of the Soviet threat faces us today with the prospect that haunted Roosevelt half a century ago-the return to the womb in American foreign policy.<sup>1</sup>

Although significant reductions in strategic nuclear weapons have occurred since the fall of the Berlin wall, plenty of work still remains to be done to achieve non-proliferation of all types of Weapons of Mass Destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical), or WMD, as they are known today. WMD in the wrong hands are an absolutely terrifying thought, and yet are a reality with Iran and Iraq. Even more disturbing, these two belligerents have used

WMD, as sovereign nations, against each other, as well as against their own citizens. What prevents them from using WMD against other sovereign nations? Probably nothing if sufficiently provoked.

That sort of predictability and world stability was hardly great. We as a nation were more comfortable during the Cold War than we are now, right? Taking up the torch against communism may not have been such a bad idea afterall, but what happens when a nation wins in both theory and reality? Welcome, to the age of the "new world order" where ambiguity reigns and national security policy is perceived as being driven by global transparency a by product of the information age. National interests do not seem to be as richly defined nor fully understood anymore. Why does our foreign policy seem anything but clear these days to the average tax paying citizen? It is indeed, the right question to ask national leaders who get paid to answer these hard questions and are charged with formulating our long term national strategic goals and objectives. Unfortunately, because of the "information age", "cyberspace" technology, and our insatiable appetite for instant gratification, a distinct cause and effect relationship occurs on all matters of foreign and domestic business. Things, formerly tagged as routine, important or urgent, suddenly look critical. And distinguishing one from the other has become an art in and of itself.

Today, world events occur and are reported in nano-seconds. Multi-media technological advances have actually created an expectation for the every day media consumer who want and get all the news now. This is not so bad if everything falls into the "hot" basket and probably not so good for the pragmatist, either. Also known as "global transparency," it helps feed that instant gratification frenzy we all experience from time to time. Surfing the cable television channels and the world wide web gives us that instant, "fix my problem now" attitude we can so easily grow accustomed to, by a little thumb pressure on a universal remote or click of the old personal computer mouse. Tragically, however, the right to know, not the need to know, has

become the norm, and not the exception. Embedded in our Constitution is the inalienable right to, "freedom of the press". Bottom line, the media can report what they think is news that we can use, 24 hours a day.

By working this freedom to our advantage, we have subsequently allowed ourselves to be shaped by the here and now. A reaction oriented society we are, vice one accustomed to planning ahead. This kind of mentality only leads to aggression, impatience, and leaves much to chance. Not only that, it leaves the impression among other democratic nations that we are dissatisfied most of the time and are ready to throw our tempers around when we don't get our immediate way. Our pacifier is instant gratification and not, " deferred gratification" or, the ability to understand and accept that putting off immediate satisfaction can lead to a greater satisfaction down the line."2 When we are quickly confronted with world events, particularly catastrophic tragedies, (e.g., mass starvation, ethnic cleansing, civil wars, natural disasters, and etc.), the first thing we ask ourselves and our nation's leaders is, do we have a moral obligation to help, and why? Can we, should we? If so, how, when, and to what extent do we? What are other nations doing, either unilaterally or collectively, about the situation? Is this a vital national interest to our nation and its own well being? What is our current policy and is it flexible enough to adapt to the particular situation? What elements of national power are at our immediate disposal to respond? Finally, what is politically correct, now, and what are the prospects in the future for a face change?

These are all fair and tough questions which certainly demand our attention. Opinion on this intriguing subject has ruled the day since the decline and subsequent break up of the former Soviet Empire. Its political fervor is so strong that the argument seems to have no limits about what our national interests are and are not. Let us take a look, then, at national interests their encompassing philosophies, and the great political debates on their subsequent application.

#### National Interests

Overarching the National Security Strategy are our national interests.

It seems crisp, clear, objective: what's good for the nation as a whole in international affairs. (What's good for the nation as a whole in domestic affairs is the public interest.) National interest lies at the very heart of the military and diplomatic professions and leads to the formulation of a national strategy and of the calculation of the power necessary to support that strategy.<sup>3</sup>

In taxpayer speak, national interests are defined as physical survival, economic security, and national sovereignty. They are further sub categorized as <u>vital</u>, <u>important</u>, and <u>peripheral</u>. To put them in perspective, matters of vital national interest threaten the perceived survivability of our nation (e.g., a pre-emptive WMD strike on the United States or the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 threatening the free flow of Mid-East oil to the world).

The United States is at any one time committed to a set of strategic policies aimed at supporting or implementing those purposes or interests that have either been explicitly designated as 'vital' or are likely to be felt as such under challenge. We hear much glib talk about those interests, as if the speakers knew exactly what they are or ought to be. Yet they are not fixed by nature nor identifiable by any generally accepted standard of objective criteria.<sup>4</sup>

Likewise, matters of important and peripheral interests can cause second and third order effects to national security which may or may not justify the use of all or combinations of our elements of national power (i.e., political, economic, and military) either collectively or individually to secure our national security. The great political debates past and present, over our national interests lies within the interpretation of our nation's current political character, pulse and climate.

# Realism and Idealism

A nation's political character is a direct reflection of its geography, elected officials, political office appointees, world events and the voting public. Political direction is adjudicated by its national fervor and conscious. Also, what others perceive it to be, or as commonly referred to, as image, becomes just as important as substance.

For instance, the Founding Fathers practiced a cautious realism in preserving and expanding the 13 original states, indicating they understood the concept of national interest...Washington's farewell address...Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a remote relation...she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns.<sup>5</sup>

Roskin's research certainly indicates that our Founding Fathers set the strategic direction and political character of our new nation. The simple fact that our nation has been isolated from the rest of the world by its mere geography has been quite influential with regards to our national interests and foreign policy formulation. Author, Stephen Ambrose, points out in his book, that President Jefferson's sole purpose for financing the Lewis and Clark expedition from 1803 to 1806 was to discover a northwest water route to the Pacific for enhancing our young nation's commerce. Clearly, a realistic approach to national economic security, meant tending to business at home and not abroad. This has been a common feature of our nation's growing pains, and probably one which has yet to outlive its political usefulness.

Up until the turn of the 20th century, our national interests remained consistent with the 'realist' outlook and further "took a back seat to ethical and normative approaches to international relations." President Woodrow Wilson however, changed all that for a short while and launched his neo-isolationist nation out of isolationist traditions by establishing a "legalistic-moralistic" approach to American international relations. It was the Great War which caused this sudden change in attitude and national character only to result in Wilsonian concepts and the US Congress clashing over political ideology. The "new world order" as Wilson would like to have seen it through the League of Nations (i.e., global collective security) would not come to fruition until post-World War II. President Roosevelt had the vision, to sow the idealist seeds during the war, resulting in late 1945 with the creation of the United Nations. Wilsonian ideology was revived! America took the lead this time because of the very fact that World War II was truly meant to be, "the war to end all wars". Since then, our nation has undergone

navigational changes in national character at least three times and maybe four, from Korea through Desert Shield/Desert Storm and, on into more recent times, Operations Other Than War. Arthur Schlesinger's Foreign Affairs article, "Back to the Womb?", tells us that a new wave of neo-isolationism is upon us, draws strength from the understanding that Americans want to look home first, and that they generally disagree with the current administration as well as internationalists who set our nation on a chart course of a value based crusade to establish human rights and democracy for the world. Bottom line, "public support for the protection of weaker nations against foreign aggression fell from 57 to 24%, while there was a 24% decline in support for the promotion of human rights..." Although this data was collected in mid-1995, the foregone conclusion is, public support has probably been on a steady decline since then.

Selling idealism to the American public these days is a pretty tough tasker and requires quite a bit of political maneuvering to sway the taxpayer into saying yes to "value based" interventionism around the globe. Replete in the news today are the home front stories talking about the contradictions within the halls of Congress, the rise in crime, particularly crimes of hate, international terrorism on our streets, taxes gnawing away at disposable income, non-existent public health care, increases in unemployment and welfare recipients along with the generally accurate perception that quality public education is dropping off. All, very real and "in your face" type concerns in the day-to-day lives of our citizens. The immediate focus, therefore, is the home front and American involvement overseas to assist in collective security missions contradicts not only our national character but national will too. This begs for a clear and unambiguous explanation of what truly are, our national interests today.

As the world's leading "superpower" the United States, by default, certainly takes the position of defacto world leader, at least for the near term (next 5 to 10 years) anyway. Which implies, we already have the

resources to assist and take charge of UN and other collective security missions, as they fit into our present day National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement<sup>11</sup>. Just because we can, are we compelled to get involved? Now that the general picture has been painted here, it's time to shift gears and focus on the real meat and potatoes of this paper, Peace Operations and Enforcing Restraint.

# Peace Operations

In today's political vernacular, Peace Operations imply both Peacekeeping and Peace-Enforcement type activities. Peacekeeping is defined by the UN as the use of military forces and/or civilian personnel at the request of the parties to a dispute to help supervise a cease-fire and separate the parties. Peace-Enforcement, on the other hand, as defined by the UN, is the military intervention to forcefully separate combatants. 12 Peace-Enforcement, is clearly combat. It can also develop as a sub component of Peacekeeping if and when the separated parties become fragmented from within, initiate new agendas, and factions from the former parties no longer agree with the overall terms of the "peace" and their expectations are not being met. Author, Donald Snow says, "The Secretary General to the UN...fails to distinguish adequately between Peacekeeping and Peace-Enforcement."13 He goes on to point out that peacekeeping is an easy task of monitoring and enforcing an agreed upon cease- fire between combatants. Peace already exists and most importantly, peace is preferred as opposed to war. Peace-Enforcement implies non-acceptance by the combatants and "entails the physical interposition of armed forces to separate combatants to create the conditions for a cease-fire that does not exist". 14 Peace enforcers are active fighters whose mission is to impose a cease-fire where one does not exist. The underlying problem with this type of mission is that the so called peace enforcers must be "squeakyneutral-clean" prior to their intervention. Otherwise, any hint of nonneutrality (taking sides) spells disaster for the Peace Operations mission.

In President Clinton's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, he says, "When our interests call for it, the United States must also be prepared to participate in multilateral efforts to resolve regional conflicts and bolster new democratic governments...be ready to participate in Peacekeeping, Peace-Enforcement and other operations in support of these objectives. 15

The dilemma we have here is who determines our national interests, the American taxpayer or The White House? The meta-ethical authority lies in The White House but our current national character make up of the country clashes with this authority creating a political battle fought over interpreting constitutional terms and posing a significant political threat to the President and the Congress. Sending ambiguous signals to our allies are very confusing because we give the appearance of not being in control of our own destiny to keep changing our course in mid stream. Truly, a political obstacle of monumental proportions. "How do you persuade the housewife in Xenia, Ohio, that her husband, brother, son or daughter should die in some other place where vital interests are not involved...or for that matter, how many stalwart internationalists in the Council on Foreign Relations would send their own sons and daughters to die in Bosnia or Somalia?16

The real danger we have here is that the idealist can transform him or herself in to an 'altruist'. Webster's definition of an altruist is a person who has unselfish concern for others. One who believes in altruism thinks his own self interests are everyone else's as well. When developing national interests, the altruist is so broad minded and aloof, that anything can look good on any given day. President Wilson was an altruist when it came to the literal interpretation of the League of Nations Charter, which is probably why Congressional acceptance faltered. Hans Morganthau, the 'forbidden realist' in this century, "would argue the United States could be engaged permanently in a half a dozen wars around the globe, a frittering away of US power that could come to no good end."<sup>17</sup> If we could, should we? An ethical dilemma, a question of morality. Would we have the moral courage to say, no? Where is all the political pressure coming from to get involved every time "global transparency" rears its ugly, wiry head? Let's review some intervention "case studies" where our vital national interests appear to have been at stake.

# Exercising Restraint

Somalia began as a UN sanctioned humanitarian effort in late 1992 to provide convoy and distribution security to Non-Governmental (NGO) and Private Organizations (PVO) distributing badly needed food and medical supplies to outlying villages and towns. Starvation, clan wars, and repeated record droughts had a devastating effect on the Somali population. World opinion was strongest in stemming the tide of death and starvation as "global transparency" depicted dying children by the thousands each day. To complicate matters, internal warring clans murdered innocent people at will and basically took anything they wanted with threats of extortion and force directed at Non-Governmental and Private Volunteer Organizations. Once foodstuffs were in their hands, they turned right around and sold them at extravagant black market prices to the starving masses. To make matters worse, these factions began threatening UN humanitarian efforts almost at will.

The United States had clear political aims with the humanitarian assistance security program. The ends were achievable, simply stop the starvation. The ways or concept envisioned, planned the use of the UN Security Council to authorize a multi-national force (means) to secure the routes, warehouses, and port facilities for humanitarian assistance efforts to influence change for the better. All of this was simply designed to ensure responsive distribution of foodstuffs and medical supplies for the general populace. International and domestic opinion were clearly behind this one. It just seemed to be politically and morally proper. The commitment of the American people and Congress were as strong as that, for the intervention in the Persian Gulf, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in the summer of 1990. American resolve was riding high. We could do no wrong with this one because we were completely neutral in this endeavor.

In early June 1993, things quickly changed when the Aideed militia clans stepped up daring action against UN security forces culminating with an attack

on the Pakistani Forces killing some 23 soldiers. UN rules of engagement were very restrictive at that time and simply put soldiers at risk as they were not able to fire on belligerents unless fired on first, in care of self defense, as we understand it. This was a humanitarian effort, "feed the masses". But, the UN Security Council changed the mission and convinced our National Command Authorities to take sides, violate neutrality, and go on a man hunt for Mohammed Farah Aideed. In addition, disarm the warring factions who drove small weapons type pick up trucks known as "technicals", strike ammunition and weapons caches, and basically, police the streets as part of a "nation building program". This mission change occurred without subsequent policy change on the rules of engagement. US forces found themselves playing policeman with a "bluff" that could be called by the "technicals". Going after Aidid meant opening "Pandora's Box" for anything. Aideed's influence over the other warring clans and their warlords was larger than their own little agenda. The mission change only served to unite all the warlords with a common cause against any UN Forces, regardless of nationality. This common cause caught on quickly and caused tragedy in early October 1993.

There is truth to the aphorism that little things seem big over a short period of time. The US lost eighteen US Army Rangers through some of the closest and fiercest combat seen in this century because our national vision was blurred. Thanks to "global transparency", we got a good prime time viewing of our dead soldiers being dragged through the streets right before the eyes of their next of kin who had not yet been notified of what had transpired just a few hours before. How did a pure and simple humanitarian effort turn so sour, so quickly? Did the American taxpayer have a vote in the this vital national interest? Was it vital? There was no excuse. Our leaders let us down on that one. Just because we could, we did, and consequently paid the ultimate price in blood, and for what? Unfortunately, things in Somalia are not much different today. Warlord lawlessness and disorder still reign with full "vim and vigor" as if we had never been there.

It is not clear yet that the right lessons have been learned from the Somalia intervention. Former Secretary of State, the Honorable James Baker spoke to the Washington Press Club in October 1995 and spoke principally about American foreign policy issues during this complex post Cold War era. In particular, on the subject of former Yugoslavia, but it had applications to lessons learned from the Somalia debacle. In his speech, he was adamant about what conditions must exist before committing US forces to a Peace-Enforcement mission as part of a larger NATO contingent. First, he said a peace agreement had to be in place, not just a cease-fire. Second, we as a nation must have clear political aims (ends) before we participate. Third, what are the rules of engagement for our forces as they maintain the peace and what are they when things quickly deteriorate? Fourth, what is the exit strategy? and does it tie into our political aims?<sup>18</sup>

Because of the debacle in Somalia the Clinton administration went back to the drawing board and started to work on a National Security Strategy which was published in February 1995 (roughly eight months later). In the meantime, another international crisis developed, this time in Rwanda; genocidal terror. In addition, Somalia and the horrible experience we had there are the reasons realists in Congress attempt to cut and/or restrict American taxpayer dollars from entering into the UN coffers for financing UN Peacekeeping efforts.

President Clinton issued a policy directive in April 1994, shortly after US Forces left Somalia, that implied a sharp curtailment of American involvement in future armed humanitarian interventions and that marked a retreat from his administration's earlier rhetoric of assertive multilateralism.<sup>19</sup>

So, what about our national moral courage in the Somalia mission? One can say that our objectives were correct in trying to assist the world community in stopping mass starvation which "global transparency" provided to our living rooms every night in Technicolor. Okay, we intervened for the sake of humanity afterall; we could, so we did. The moral courage, however, to say no to a mission change escaped our ethical standards. The moment we signed up

for the Aidid man hunt, we were trapped in Somali politics and there was only one way out, get Aidid. What a tragedy, for a super power coming off one of the greatest coalition efforts of all time, in the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91.

Haiti was a mission (17 September 1994) which hopefully reflected the lessons learned from our failure in Somalia. It began as a crusade to return the democratically elected President Juan Baptiste Aristid, to the Presidential Palace in October, 1994. This one was "a piece of cake", sort of the tough "Monroe Doctrine" back at work in the 20th Century. Nothing like the so-called US occupation of Haiti by the United States Marine Corps in the 1920's where we failed miserably with the use of one of our elements of national power. Interesting enough, back then, our nation was flexing its muscles on a poor Caribbean island nation who could literally drop off the face of the earth and not affect US vital national interests. But this time, we were determined to do it right, besides it gave our Caribbean neighbors an opportunity to show their skills by forming a Caribbean Command outfit known as CARICOM to help out in the performance of our democratic duty. Not only did we train and equip them, we transported them, housed them, fed them, and took care of their every day needs. Unfortunately, their performance was comparable to Boy Scouts on their first five mile hike in public. Their tasks were simple, provide security to the Port-au-Prince port facilities. This was accomplished, but not to standards of discipline we were accustomed to. CARICOM soldiers were caught sleeping on duty at night and stealing from other international forces regularly. Discipline overall, was lacking to say the least.

The bottom line mission in Haiti was to establish a safe and secure environment for the return of the democratically elected president to his country. In addition, humanitarian operations in Guantanamo Bay for both Cuban and Haitian refugees was reaching the breaking point. Boat people from both countries were taxing American resolve and patience enormously. There

was just no other choice, get Aristid back in office, whatever it took. No more Somalia's however; have a clear cut mission with achievable political aims and bring our troops home at the earliest. At the last minute the ruling military junta saw "the burning bush" and decided to honorably leave for fear of overwhelming combat power heading their way, and the world defacto leader meant business. Mission?, return President Aristid to office on 15 October 1994. That was accomplished without a hitch, but what happened after that left something to be desired. Under the guise of preparing the country for a UN mission from the Multi-National Forces Haiti, "mission creep" began to settle in quickly.

It gave the appearance of looking for work to do. Nation building slipped into the mission statement by 'Restoring Democracy' to this tiny island nation to our Southeast. Turning on power grids, pumping fuel into remote power generation stations, vetting the former military into a reputable and well uniformed police force observed, trained, and medically clean to do the job right, as well as seize and "buy back" weapons in the tens of thousands to prevent further anarchy and fear at the same time. Once again, "global transparency" put the American public at ease with its up front coverage of all the details that went along with Peace Operations, to include the second day US forces were in country when Haitian policeman were seen on television, beating innocent men, women, and children while US soldiers were not allowed to intervene. Although the ROE were much more robust than they had been in Somalia (i.e., engage hostile intent with deadly force if a friendly response was not signaled back) they did not include however instructions on what to do when hostile intent was inflicted on its own citizens. After all, we were there for one reason, restore democracy, correct? And democratic nations don't generally persecute their own citizens in their streets, homes, public facilities, etc., right? So we had to have a huddle and request a change in orders to properly restore democracy. Besides, our actions and inaction's were subject to "global transparency". Seventeen months later, Feb. 96' all US forces were finally out of country. Reportedly,

Haiti is no better off now than it was in September 1994 when the 82d Airborne Division and selected Special Operations Forces were enroute to kick in the door at Port-au-Prince in the name of democracy. The actual military operation was a tremendous success, well organized, rehearsed throughout preceding months, and synergystically wrapped tight with all services. What were and are our vital national interests that required over 30,000 of our uniformed men and women in our Armed Forces? What other political agenda were out there? Were the advocates of idealism willing to risk the lives of their sons and daughters for Haiti?

Remember this operation was planned to provide the "big bang principle", with overwhelming combat power up front to get the message across real quick that we meant business. Was it intended to send a signal to Cuba and Fidel Castro, "this could be happening to you if you don't watch out." During a time of severe defense resource cutbacks and the furtherance of force realignment and base closures, what was the real national purpose in all this? Where was the opinion of the American taxpayer during all this? Finally, where was the moral courage to say no, we just can't afford this one. What would have happened had Iraq really started something serious in Kuwait once again? In the hierarchy of national will, how did Haiti rise to the top?

Bosnia, currently, is our latest endeavor to be involved somehow in the "new world order". Unfortunately, it is a bit late, since we value our ability to selectively engage when and where we feel like it. Only after hundreds of thousands were killed by the fighting as well as the ethnic cleansing episodes two years ago, did we finally selectively engage, and only when it was convenient for us to do so. Our national interests in Bosnia are an embarrassment to the international community of democratic nations.

Neutrality was lost the day we sponsored the UN Security Council Resolution to embargo arms for the Muslims who were being butchered by the Bosnian Serbs in order to prevent further escalation of the so called civil war and regional instability. Somehow the UN actually convinced itself that it could intervene

inside a sovereign nation's borders to separate the combatants with the support of NATO to do so. The UN effort started out by attempting to get relief supplies to various enclaves of people throughout the war torn country. Often relief convoys were either delayed or turned around at "gunpoint" by Bosnian Serbs thus thumbing their nose at the international community.

As pointed out by former Secretary of State James Baker, "the problem in former Yugoslavia, "he said, is that the fighting involves deep rooted hatreds, both religious and ethnic, its been long-standing and the belligerents don't normally recognize 'peace as the norm'."20 Therein lies the real danger with a Peace-Enforcement type intervention inside a nation's own borders. "Global transparency" and the political nature of the overall peacekeeping effort with the international community, can help to create another Somalia debacle, whereas "a single infantry unit can bring immediate praise or comdemnation from the world community for its actions or inaction's on the ground."21 The political sensitivity here, is that there is absolutely no room for error. Unfortunately, our soldiers are already viewed as having taken sides and are probably not aware of it. It would be quite easy for the combatants to strike at America where it means the most, her national will and public support. To call our bluff should be quite tempting because our national character is contrary to this intervention. From the very beginning of the peace process with the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995, the American public and Congress were not convinced that this was the right thing to do. Bosnian Serbs have already violated the Accords exacting responses from the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). Credibility, is at serious risk to say the least from not only this activity but from NATO inaction back in the early 90's when the first horrible signs of civil war were occurring. If NATO was so concerned about regional stability and human rights, why did it wait so long to intervene? Western society wasted no time embracing Slovenia, but turned a cold shoulder to the former Yugoslavia. Why? If value-based interventions are of so much concern, why did Europe, NATO, or even the European Union procrastinate for so long before stepping up to the

plate? Where was the moral highground when those people needed help four years ago? Do we step up the enlargement policy by intervening in the former Soviet Union's little civil wars and struggle to resemble some sort of democracy? Is not their regional stability important also? Do we have the moral courage to say, we thank you for your collapse, but by the way, can't help you out right now. We were too busy getting involved with Somalia and Haiti.

# Conclusion

Prior to the Post Cold War, we as a nation, had the moral obligation and the courage to take a stand against repression and occupationist regimes. We accomplished this endeavor through a "containment policy" with the Truman through Reagan administrations. This stand however, was not without pain and enduring loss. The free nations of the world who signed up to take a stand against communism, paid the ultimate price both collectively and individually with the blood of their sons and daughters. We also know, that price was not in vain, because it defeated communism for the most part and further opened the doors of democratic opportunity. The collapse of the "Iron Curtain" was a symbolic event of that victory. Since that shining moment, the scramble for national identity, self rule, and "new order" have caused great concern for the established democratic community. Why? Because the fog of uncertainty has helped to blur our once believed "clear vision". It's caused deferred satisfaction to take a back seat to instant gratification.

Dr. Gary L. Guertner, Chairman of the Department of National Security Strategy at the US Army War College presented four options to the US Army War College Class of 96' in regards to, US Post Cold War National Strategy: "come home America" (neo-isolationism), Pax Americana as the world policeman, provide support and leadership in collective security aggreements; and, pragmatic intervention and selective engagement. He went on to say that public pressures to attend to domestic issues coupled with declining defense

budgets cause controversy when formulating National Security Strategy. All of these have and will continue to help shape our *national interests*. A "go it alone attitude" won't work either because we simply do not have the resources anymore to tackle problems with that philosophy.<sup>22</sup>

Exercising restraint from becoming the master craftsman in the world is a tough choice. National interests, particularly vital ones, are pretty cut and dried even for the American taxpayer to understand. They certainly should include the public interest and trust. Elements of national power can solve many problems when used in a collective framework with other nations. Standing up fragile democracies, feeding starving masses, and providing other types of humanitarian relief are fine if, and only when, a clear and concise end state is in mind. The use of military force to resolve these problems is not the only means of resolution. Besides, with the Congress looking for more ways to trim deficit spending, the size and capabilities of our Armed Forces becomes a target of opportunity for fixing discretionary funding gaps.

With "sovereignty" still being the overall structural organization with which the civilized and advanced nations of the world recognize as international order, multilateral intervention within a nation's own borders, is not necessarily the morally right thing to do. Invasion of that country's sovereignty is a different kettle of fish altogether. Ethnic conflicts and the struggle for national identity by multi-ethnic peoples represents growing pains associated with independence from previous occupational rule by some sovereign power. Collective intervention to internal conflicts simply spells complexity and usually requires complete neutrality, something exceptionally hard to come by these days when our own National Security Strategy supports the struggle for values and democratic principles, regardless of where they may be happening. Unfortunately, not all "young democracies" see the world and its values the same as we do. Just because it works for us does not guarantee it is going to somewhere else. After all, we still need to get our own house in order before we crusade to get someone else's in order.

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